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CBO
Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic 
Output from April 2010 Through June 2010
In February 2009, in response to significant weakness 
in the economy, lawmakers enacted the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The legisla-
tion’s numerous spending and revenue provisions can be 
grouped into several categories according to their focus:
B Providing funds to states and localities—for example, 
by raising federal matching rates under Medicaid, 
providing aid for education, and increasing financial 
support for some transportation projects;
B Supporting people in need—such as by extending and 
expanding unemployment benefits and increasing 
benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (formerly the Food Stamp program);
B Purchasing goods and services—for instance, by fund-
ing construction and other investment activities that 
could take several years to complete; and
B Providing temporary tax relief for individuals and 
businesses—such as by raising exemption amounts for 
the alternative minimum tax, adding a new Making 
Work Pay tax credit, and creating enhanced deduc-
tions for depreciation of business equipment.
When ARRA was being considered, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation estimated that it would increase budget 
deficits by $787 billion between fiscal years 2009 and 
2019. CBO now estimates that the total impact over the 
2009–2019 period will amount to $814 billion. Close to 
half of that impact is estimated to occur in fiscal year 
2010, and about 70 percent of ARRA’s budgetary impact 
will have been realized by the close of that fiscal year.
Various recipients of ARRA’s funds (most recipients of 
grants and loans, contractors, and subcontractors) are 
required to report, after the end of each calendar quarter, 
the number of jobs funded through ARRA. The law also 
requires CBO to comment on those reported numbers.1
During the second quarter of 2010, recipients reported, 
ARRA funded almost 750,000 full-time-equivalent 
(FTE) jobs.2 Those reports, however, do not provide a 
comprehensive estimate of the law’s impact on U.S. 
employment, which could be higher or lower than the 
number of FTE jobs reported, for several reasons (in 
addition to any issues concerning the quality of the
1. Public Law 111-5, sections 1512(c) and 1512(e); 123 Stat. 115, 
288. This current report is the fourth in CBO’s series of quarterly 
reports. For the previous report, see Congressional Budget Office, 
Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on 
Employment and Economic Output from January 2010 Through 
March 2010 (May 2010). 
2. Data compiled from recipients’ reports (on jobs funded and other 
information) are shown at www.recovery.gov. Recipients were 
asked to calculate FTEs by taking the total number of hours 
worked in a quarter that were funded by ARRA, and dividing the 
total by the number of hours that a full-time employee would 
have worked in that quarter.
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reports’ data).3 First, some of the jobs included in the 
reports might have existed even without the stimulus 
package, with employees working on the same activities 
or other activities. Second, the reports cover employers 
that received ARRA funding directly and those employ-
ers’ immediate subcontractors (the so-called primary and 
secondary recipients of ARRA funding) but not lower-
level subcontractors. Third, the reports do not attempt to 
measure the number of jobs that were created or retained 
indirectly as a result of recipients’ increased income, and 
the increased income of their employees, which could 
boost demand for other products and services as they 
spent their paychecks. Fourth, the recipients’ reports 
cover only certain ARRA appropriations, which encom-
pass about one-fifth of the total either spent by the gov-
ernment or conveyed through tax reductions in ARRA 
during the second quarter; the reports do not measure the 
effects of other provisions of the stimulus package, such 
as tax cuts and transfer payments (including unemploy-
ment insurance payments) to individual people. 
Estimating the law’s overall effects on employment 
requires a more comprehensive analysis than can be 
achieved by using the recipients’ reports. Therefore, 
looking at recorded spending to date along with estimates 
of the other effects of ARRA on spending and revenues, 
CBO has estimated the law’s impact on employment 
and economic output using evidence about the effects 
of previous similar policies and drawing on various 
mathematical models that represent the workings of the 
economy. On that basis, CBO estimates that ARRA’s 
policies had the following effects in the second quarter 
of calendar year 2010:
B They raised real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic 
product (GDP) by between 1.7 percent and 
4.5 percent, 
B Lowered the unemployment rate by between 
0.7 percentage points and 1.8 percentage points,
B Increased the number of people employed by between 
1.4 million and 3.3 million, and
B Increased the number of full-time-equivalent jobs by 
2.0 million to 4.8 million compared with what would 
have occurred otherwise (see Table 1). (Increases in 
FTE jobs include shifts from part-time to full-time 
work or overtime and are thus generally larger than 
increases in the number of employed workers). 
The effects of ARRA on output are expected to gradually 
diminish during the second half of 2010 and beyond. 
The effects of ARRA on employment and unemployment 
are expected to lag slightly behind the effects on output; 
they are expected to wane gradually in 2011 and beyond.
CBO’s current estimates reflect small revisions to its 
earlier projections of the timing and magnitude of 
changes to federal revenues and spending under ARRA. 
They also reflect, for 2011 and 2012, a small shift in 
CBO’s assumptions about the future actions of the 
Federal Reserve.
Although CBO has examined data on output and 
employment during the period since ARRA’s enactment, 
those data are not as helpful in determining ARRA’s eco-
nomic effects as might be supposed because isolating the 
effects would require knowing what path the economy 
would have taken in the absence of the law. Because that 
path cannot be observed, the new data add only limited 
information about ARRA’s impact.4 
Measuring ARRA’s Impact Using 
Recipients’ Reports
ARRA requires primary and secondary recipients of more 
than $25,000 from appropriations made under the law to 
report a variety of information each calendar quarter. 
That group includes most grant and loan recipients, 
3. For a discussion of data quality, see Government Accountability 
Office, Recovery Act: One Year Later, States’ and Localities’ Uses of 
Funds and Opportunities to Strengthen Accountability, GAO-10-
437 (March 2010), www.gao.gov/new.items/d10437.pdf. 
4. For an analysis of the economic effects of ARRA based on the 
amount of ARRA spending and employment outcomes by state, 
see Daniel J. Wilson, Fiscal Spending Multipliers: Evidence from the 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, San Francisco 
Federal Reserve Bank Working Paper 2010-17 (June 2010), 
www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2010/wp10-
17bk.pdf.
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Table 1.
Estimated Macroeconomic Impact of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, 2009 to 2012
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: * = between -0.05 and 0.05.
a. A year of full-time-equivalent employment is 40 hours of employment per week for one year.
contractors, and subcontractors, but it excludes individ-
ual people. The information to be submitted includes the 
amount of funding received and spent; the name, 
description, and completion status of the project or 
activity funded; the number of jobs funded; and, for 
investments in infrastructure, the purpose and cost of 
the investment. Recipients who filed second-quarter 
reports in July 2010 reported the number of jobs on 
the basis of the number of employee hours paid for 
with ARRA funds in the quarter.5
According to those reports, 749,142 full-time-equivalent 
jobs were funded by ARRA during the second quarter.6 
However, the reported number of jobs funded is not a 
comprehensive measure of ARRA’s effect on overall 
employment, or even of those provisions of ARRA for 
which recipients’ reports are required. The actual impact 
could, in principle, be significantly larger or smaller than 
the number of jobs reported. 
If, for example, recipients’ reports include employment 
that would have occurred without ARRA, the impact on 
employment suggested by the reports could be too great. 
Some people whose employment was attributed to ARRA 
might have worked on other activities in the absence of 
the law—for example, a business might have bid on other 
projects if its resources had not been committed to proj-
ects funded by ARRA. In the case of government employ-
ees, state or local taxes might have been raised in the 
Q1 0.1 0.1 * * * * * 0.1
Q2 0.8 1.3 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7
Q3 1.2 2.4 -0.3 -0.6 0.6 1.1 0.9 1.7
Q4 1.4 3.3 -0.5 -1.0 0.9 1.9 1.3 2.7
Q1 1.7 4.1 -0.7 -1.5 1.2 2.7 1.7 3.9
Q2 1.7 4.5 -0.7 -1.8 1.4 3.3 2.0 4.8
Q3 1.5 4.2 -0.8 -2.0 1.4 3.6 2.0 5.2
Q4 1.1 3.6 -0.7 -1.9 1.3 3.5 1.8 5.0
2009 0.9 1.8 -0.3 -0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.3
2010 1.5 4.1 -0.7 -1.8 1.3 3.3 1.9 4.7
2011 0.7 2.3 -0.5 -1.5 0.9 2.7 1.2 3.7
2012 0.2 0.5 -0.2 -0.5 0.3 0.9 0.3 1.0
Change Attributable to ARRA
2009 (Calendar Year Quarter)
2010 (Calendar Year Quarter)
(Millions of people)
Full-Time-Equivalent
 Employment (Millions)a
Low High
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Low High
Estimate
Calendar Year Average
Real Gross Domestic 
Product (Percent) (Percentage points)
Unemployment Rate Employment
Low High
Estimate Estimate Estimate
Low High
5. Specifically, recipients were instructed to calculate the number 
of FTE jobs funded through ARRA by counting the total number 
of hours worked that were funded by ARRA during the second 
quarter, divided by the number of hours in a full-time schedule for 
a quarter. For details and examples, see Office of Management and 
Budget, “Recovery FAQs for Federal Contractors on Reporting,” 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/recovery_faqs_contractors/#report15.
6. For the number of jobs by agency, see “Top Agencies, as Reported 
by Recipients (Apr 1–Jun 30, 2010),” www.recovery.gov/Pages
/TextView.aspx?data=jobSummaryAgency&topnumber
=200&qtr=2010Q2.
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absence of ARRA funding (or transfer payments might 
have been reduced) to pay for some of the jobs that were 
counted as funded by ARRA. 
Conversely, the reported figure could be too low because 
the reporting requirement is limited to primary and 
secondary recipients of funds and thus excludes lower-
level recipients, such as subcontractors hired by a main 
subcontractor. Thus, if expenditures under ARRA led 
to increases in employment among lower-level sub-
contractors and vendors, those effects would be missed 
by the reports. 
Recipients’ reports also do not include indirect effects 
that could increase or decrease the impact on employ-
ment. Among those effects are potential declines in 
employment in other businesses or economic sectors as 
demand shifts toward the recipients of ARRA funding—a 
phenomenon often called the “crowding out” effect of 
government policies. Conversely, spending under ARRA 
could lead to higher employment at companies that are 
not directly connected to that spending—for example, 
because of additional purchases made by people who 
would be unemployed were it not for ARRA funds. 
CBO estimates that, under current conditions, the posi-
tive indirect effects outweigh the negative indirect effects. 
Taken together, in CBO’s estimation, ARRA’s indirect 
effects boost the law’s impact on economic output and 
employment. 
Finally, the recipients’ reports reflect only about one-fifth 
of the total amount of spending increases or tax reduc-
tions during the second quarter of 2010 that are attribut-
able to ARRA’s provisions. The reports cover direct gov-
ernment purchases of goods and services, grants and 
loans to private entities, and grants to states and localities, 
but they do not cover tax cuts or increases in transfer pay-
ments to individuals. The tax reductions and spending 
that are not covered by the recipients’ reports probably 
had substantial effects on purchases of goods and services 
and, therefore, on employment.
Measuring ARRA’s Impact Using 
Economic Models and Historical Data
CBO used various economic models and historical data 
to guide its estimate of the way in which output and 
employment are affected by increases in outlays 
and reductions in revenues under ARRA. CBO’s assess-
ment is that different elements of ARRA (such as particu-
lar types of tax cuts, transfer payments, and government 
purchases) have had different effects on economic output 
per dollar of higher spending or lower tax receipts. Multi-
plying estimates of those per-dollar effects by the dollar 
amounts of each element of ARRA yields an estimate of 
the law’s total impact on output. To produce estimates 
of ARRA’s total impact on employment, CBO combined 
that estimate with estimates of how changes in output 
affect the unemployment rate and participation in the 
labor force.
CBO’s Modeling Approach
CBO used evidence from models and historical relation-
ships to determine estimated “multipliers” for each of sev-
eral categories of spending and tax provisions in ARRA 
(see Table 2 on page 6). Each multiplier represents the 
estimated direct and indirect effects on the nation’s out-
put of a dollar’s worth of a given policy. Therefore, a pro-
vision’s multiplier can be applied to the budgetary cost of 
that provision to estimate its overall impact on output. 
Direct effects consist of immediate (or first-round) effects 
on economic activity. Government purchases of goods 
and services directly elicit economic activity that would 
not occur otherwise and thereby have a direct dollar-for-
dollar impact on output. For reductions in taxes, 
increases in transfer payments, and increases in aid to 
state and local governments, the size of the direct effect 
depends on the policy’s impact on the behavior of recipi-
ents. If someone receives a dollar in transfer payments 
and spends 80 cents (saving the other 20 cents), produc-
tion increases over time to meet the additional demand 
generated by that spending, and the direct impact on out-
put is 80 cents. Similarly, if a dollar in aid to a state gov-
ernment leads that government to spend 50 cents more 
on employees’ salaries (but causes no other changes in 
state spending or revenues, with the other 50 cents used 
to reduce borrowing or build up rainy-day funds), the 
direct impact on output is 50 cents.
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CBO reviewed evidence on the responses of households, 
businesses, and governments to various types of tax cuts 
and transfer payments to estimate the size of those poli-
cies’ direct effects on output.7 For example:
B A one-time cash payment is likely to have less impact 
on a household’s purchases than is a longer-lasting 
change to disposable income because the one-time 
payment has a smaller effect on total lifetime dispos-
able income. 
B Increases in disposable income are likely to boost pur-
chases more for lower-income than for higher-income 
households. That difference arises, at least in part, 
because a larger share of people in lower-income 
households cannot borrow as much money as they 
would wish in order to spend more than they do 
currently. 
B Changes to corporate taxes that primarily affect after-
tax profits on past investment generally have a smaller 
impact on output than do policies that alter the return 
from new investment. 
Government policies also can have indirect effects that 
enhance or offset the direct effects. Direct effects are 
enhanced when, for example, a government policy creates 
jobs and those who are hired use their income to 
boost consumption. Direct effects also are enhanced 
when greater demand for goods and services prompts 
companies to increase investment to bolster their future 
production. 
In the other direction, substantial government spending 
can cause a shift in resources (including employees) 
away from production in other businesses and sectors to 
government-funded projects. That indirect crowding-out 
effect could cause growth in employment among recipi-
ents of ARRA funding to be offset by declines in employ-
ment elsewhere in the economy. Increases in interest rates 
are one possible mechanism for such crowding out: 
Higher interest rates discourage spending on investment 
and on durable goods such as cars because they raise the 
cost of borrowing. However, because the Federal Reserve 
kept short-term interest rates very low, that mechanism 
does not appear to have been an important factor 
through the second quarter of 2010. Another mechanism 
for crowding out is that activities funded by ARRA could 
reduce production elsewhere in the economy if they used 
scarce materials or workers with specific skills, creating 
bottlenecks that hindered other activities. That effect, 
too, was probably much smaller in the past year and a 
half than it might have been otherwise because of high 
unemployment and a large amount of unused resources 
(as well as the diversity of activities funded under ARRA). 
In estimating the magnitude of indirect effects, CBO 
relied heavily on estimates from macroeconometric fore-
casting models, informed by evidence from other types of 
models and from direct estimation using historical data. 
(For more details about those sources of information, see 
the appendix.)
CBO grouped the provisions of ARRA into general cate-
gories and assigned high and low multipliers to each. The 
ranges between high and low were chosen judgmentally 
to encompass most economists’ views about the direct 
and indirect effects of different policies. The multipliers 
indicate the cumulative impact of policies on GDP over 
several quarters, and they should be understood to apply 
to periods when the Federal Reserve is holding short-term 
interest rates about as low as possible and would not 
tighten monetary policy in response to a fiscal stimulus, 
as over the past year and a half. For instance, CBO esti-
mates that a one-time increase of $1 in federal purchases 
of goods and services in one calendar quarter last year 
raised GDP above what it would have been otherwise by 
a total of $1 to $2.50 over several quarters. That cumula-
tive multiplier of $2.50 at the high end of the range com-
prises increases in GDP of roughly $1.45 in the quarter 
when the federal spending occurred, roughly 60 cents 
in the following quarter, and roughly 45 cents in later 
quarters combined.
The multipliers are applied to outlays when they occur 
and to changes in taxes or transfer payments when they 
7. On household spending, for example, see Jonathan A. Parker 
and others, “Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus 
Payments of 2008” (February 2010), www.kellogg
.northwestern.edu/faculty/parker/htm/research/PSJM2010.pdf; 
Matthew D. Shapiro and Joel Slemrod, “Did the 2008 Tax 
Rebates Stimulate Spending?” American Economic Review, vol. 99, 
no. 2 (May 2009), pp. 374–379; Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, 
and Nicholas S. Souleles, “The Reaction of Consumer Spending 
and Debt to Tax Rebates: Evidence from Consumer Credit Data,” 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 115, no. 6 (December 2007), 
pp. 986–1019; and David S. Johnson, Jonathan A. Parker, and 
Nicholas S. Souleles, “Household Expenditure and the Income 
Tax Rebates of 2001,” American Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 5 
(December 2006), pp. 1589–1610.
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Table 2.
Estimated Output Multipliers of Major Provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act
Continued
affect disposable income. CBO’s estimates, therefore, 
account for the different rates of spending for various 
types of appropriations and, similarly, for the timing of 
different tax cuts or transfer payments. In some cases, 
when different elements of a single provision were 
estimated to have different multipliers, the total cost of a 
provision was divided among more than one category. In 
those cases, the provision is shown in Table 2 in the cate-
gory to which most of its budgetary cost applied. Provi-
sions that affect outlays (including refundable tax credits) 
are identified by the same names used in CBO’s cost esti-
mate for the conference agreement on ARRA.8 Provisions 
that affect revenues are identified by the names used in 
the revenue estimate prepared by the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation for the same legislation.9
The ranges for multipliers in Table 2 are close to those 
that CBO used in its initial analysis of the economic 
effects of ARRA in March 2009. Since then, CBO has 
Type of Activity Major Provisions of ARRA
Purchases of Goods and Services 1.0 2.5 Division A, Title II: Other; Title IV: Energy Efficiency and
by the Federal Government Renewable Energy; Title IV: Innovative Technology Loan
Guarantee Program; Title IV: Other Energy Programs; Title V: 
Federal Buildings Fund; Title VIII: National Institutes of Health;
Title VIII: Other Department of Health and Human Services
Transfer Payments to State and 1.0 2.5 Division A, Title VII: Clean Water and Drinking Water State 
Local Governments for Revolving Funds; Title XI: Other Housing Assistance; Title XII: 
Infrastructure Highway Construction; Title XII: Other Transportation 
Transfer Payments to State and 0.7 1.8 Division A, Title VIII: Education for the Disadvantaged; Title 
Local Governments for Other VIII: Special Education; Title IX: State Fiscal Stabilization Fund; 
Purposes Division B, Title V: State Fiscal Relief Fund
Transfer Payments to Individuals 0.8 2.1 Division A, Title I: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; 
Title VIII: Student Financial Assistance; Division B, Title II: 
Unemployment Compensation; Title III: Health Insurance 
Assistanceb
One-Time Payments to Retirees 0.3 1.0 Division B, Title II: Economic Recovery Payments
Two-Year Tax Cuts for Lower- 0.6 1.5 Division B, Title I: Refundable Tax Credits; Making Work Pay 
and Middle-Income People Credit; American Opportunity Tax Credit
One-Year Tax Cut for Higher- 0.2 0.6 Increase in Individual AMT Exemption Amount
Income People
Extension of First-Time 0.3 0.8 Extension of First-Time Homebuyer Credit
Homebuyer Credit
Estimated Output Multipliersa
Low Estimate High Estimate
8. See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for the conference 
agreement for H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (February 13, 2009).
9. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the 
Revenue Provisions Contained in the Conference Agreement for H.R. 
1, JCX-19-09 (February 12, 2009), www.jct.gov/x-19-09.pdf. 
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Table 2. Continued
Estimated Output Multipliers of Major Provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: Provisions affecting outlays (including refundable tax provisions) are identified by the same names used in CBO’s cost estimate for 
the conference report on H.R. 1. Provisions affecting revenues—all of which are included in title I of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act—are identified by the names used in the estimate by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) (see 
www.house.gov/jct/x-19-09.pdf).
Some provisions include individual elements that have different multipliers, by CBO’s estimate; in those cases, the provisions are listed 
with the multiplier used for the majority of the 2009–2019 budgetary cost.
The economic impact of three tax provisions with budgetary costs over $5 billion was analyzed using a different methodology, and 
their effects cannot easily be summarized by a multiplier. Those provisions were titled “Extend by Three Years the Placed-In-Service 
Date for Each Section 45 Qualified Facility” and “One-Year Extension of Special Allowance for Certain Property Acquired During 2009” 
in JCT’s estimate and “Health Information Technology” in CBO’s estimate. Some other provisions, with total budgetary costs of less 
than $7 billion, were included in the analysis but are not shown in the table.
AMT = alternative minimum tax.
a. The output multiplier is the cumulative impact of spending under the provisions on gross domestic product over several quarters. The 
ranges shown in the table assume that the Federal Reserve is holding short-term interest rates about as low as possible and would not 
tighten monetary policy in response to a fiscal stimulus.
b. This provision is a reduction in taxes, but it is treated as having the same economic impact as a transfer payment to an individual.
continued to review research on the economic impact of 
various government policies. Although some new 
research has emerged, CBO judges that the evidence, 
taken as a whole, continues to support roughly the same 
ranges for multipliers. However, earlier in the year CBO 
revised the multipliers slightly, primarily to better reflect 
the relatively low probability of different parameters 
being at the same extremes (high or low) of the ranges of 
assumptions that CBO considered. As a result, the cur-
rent ranges for multipliers are generally a bit narrower 
than the ranges reported last year. 
The estimates of ARRA’s effects on output were trans-
lated into estimates of the effects on the unemployment 
rate, total employment, and FTE employment in a series 
of steps. First, the impact on the output gap—the per-
centage difference between actual and potential output—
was calculated.10 Next, the effect of the change in the out-
put gap on the unemployment rate was estimated using 
the historical relationship between those two measures.11 
Then, the effect of changes in the unemployment rate on 
the labor force was taken into account: If unemployment 
declines and the economic environment improves, dis-
couraged workers and people who have chosen to pursue 
activities such as education rather than work will tend to 
return to the labor force. Together, the estimated effect 
on the unemployment rate and the effect on the labor 
force were used to estimate the impact on the number of 
people employed. The change in FTE employment was 
then estimated using the historical relationship between 
changes in hours per employed worker and changes in the 
Type of Activity Major Provisions of ARRA
Corporate Tax Provisions 0 0.4 Deferral and Ratable Inclusion of Income Arising from Business 
Primarily Affecting Cash Flow Indebtedness Discharged by the Reacquisition of a Debt 
Instrument; Clarification of Regulations Related to Limitations 
on Certain Built-In Losses Following an Ownership Change; 
Recovery Zone Bonds; Qualified School Construction Bonds 
Low Estimate High Estimate
Estimated Output Multipliersa
10. Potential output is the level of production that corresponds to a 
high rate of use of labor and capital. 
11. Changes in the output gap affect unemployment gradually over 
several quarters. Initially, part of a rise in output shows up as 
higher productivity and hours per worker rather than as reduced 
unemployment.
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gap between the unemployment rate and CBO’s estimate 
of the natural rate of unemployment.12 Because higher 
spending and lower taxes can affect output and unem-
ployment for some time after they occur, the impact of 
ARRA on employment in the second quarter of 2010 
depended partly on the law’s effect on spending and 
revenues in the previous year.
A key advantage of the model-based approach used in 
this analysis is the ability to provide estimates of the total 
effects throughout the economy of the government 
spending, transfer payments, and tax cuts resulting from 
ARRA. By focusing on the net change in employment, 
that approach captures both the jobs created and the jobs 
retained as a result of ARRA. 
A key disadvantage of the model-based approach is the 
considerable uncertainty about many of the economic 
relationships that are important in the modeling. Because 
economists differ on which analytical approaches provide 
the most convincing evidence about such relationships, 
they can reach different conclusions about those relation-
ships. In addition, each study involves uncertainty about 
the extent to which the results reflect the true effects of 
a given policy or the effects of other factors. For those 
reasons, CBO provides ranges of estimates of ARRA’s 
economic effects that are intended to encompass most 
economists’ views and thereby reflect the uncertainty 
involved in such estimates.
Change from CBO’s Previous Estimates of the 
Impact of ARRA 
The current estimates of the impact of ARRA on output 
and employment differ from those presented in May 
2010 primarily because new information has led CBO to 
revise its estimates of ARRA’s impact on tax revenues and 
because CBO now projects that ARRA’s policies will not 
result in higher interest rates until slightly later than 
previously forecast.
The estimated effect on revenues through the first quarter 
of 2010 was revised downward by roughly $25 billion 
from the amount CBO estimated in May 2010 largely 
because preliminary tax data indicated lower than previ-
ously estimated revenue losses from subsidies for the con-
tinuation of health insurance for certain involuntarily ter-
minated employees (under the Consolidated Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act or COBRA) and from increased 
expensing of business investment.13 In addition, CBO’s 
estimates now incorporate the assumption, based on 
CBO’s most recent economic forecast, that the economic 
impact of ARRA will not affect the Federal Reserve’s 
interest rate targets until the first quarter of 2012, rather 
than the final quarter of 2011.14 That change increases 
the projected economic effects of ARRA slightly in the 
fourth quarter of 2011 and in 2012. 
12. The natural rate of unemployment is the rate that arises from all 
sources except cyclical fluctuations in economywide demand for 
goods and services.
13. Provisions allowing businesses to take rapid depreciation of 
investments were in effect under ARRA in 2009. The lower than 
previously estimated revenue losses from those provisions through 
the first quarter of 2010 are largely offset by lower revenue gains 
over the next several years.
14. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: An Update (August 2010).
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Appendix: 
Evidence on the Economic Effects of Fiscal Stimulus
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) based its 
estimates of the economic effects of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) on 
information from various sources: macroeconometric 
forecasting models, general-equilibrium models, and 
direct extrapolations of past data. Macroeconometric 
forecasting models incorporate relationships among 
aggregate economic variables that are based largely on his-
torical evidence. General-equilibrium models, by con-
trast, are built on explicit assumptions about the decision-
making of individual people and businesses. Direct 
extrapolations of past data are generally based on correla-
tions among economic variables in the past or on the 
effects of specific types of policy events in the past.
Macroeconometric Forecasting Models
In analyzing ARRA’s economic effects, CBO drew heavily 
on versions of the commercial forecasting models of two 
economic consulting firms, Macroeconomic Advisors and 
Global Insight, and on the FRB-US model used at the 
Federal Reserve Board. Those models assume that the 
economy has an underlying potential output determined 
by the size of the labor supply, the capital stock, and tech-
nology. They also assume that actual output can change 
relative to potential output because of shifts in aggregate 
demand for goods and services from households, busi-
nesses, and the government. With those basic assump-
tions, the details of interactions among economic vari-
ables in the models are based largely on historical 
relationships, informed by theories of how those variables 
are determined (for example, the theory that total con-
sumption depends mostly on disposable income, wealth, 
and interest rates).1 Because they emphasize the influence 
of aggregate demand on output in the short run, the 
macroeconometric forecasting models tend to predict 
greater economic effects from demand-enhancing policies 
such as ARRA than some other types of models do.
Macroeconometric forecasting models of this sort are 
used widely, and they underlie most of the forecasts 
offered to the clients of economic consulting firms. In 
addition, the models that CBO uses generally produce 
results that are roughly in line with the consensus of 
private-sector forecasters, as compiled in the Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators. However, some analysts criticize this 
sort of model for being based on historical relationships 
among aggregate economic variables, such as income and 
consumption, rather than being built up from clearly 
specified rules governing the behavior of households and 
businesses. In particular, some critics argue that models 
based on historical relationships will not provide accurate 
predictions in the face of new policies or new circum-
stances. Partly to address that concern, CBO presents a 
range of possible effects rather than a single number for 
each economic variable.
To reflect current economic conditions—in which there 
is considerable uncertainty about the financial and eco-
nomic outlook and in which short-term interest rates are 
low and are expected to remain so for some time—CBO 
altered the models’ usual formulation to reduce the extent 
1. The FRB-US model differs from the other two forecasting models 
in that it explicitly incorporates the influence of expected future 
developments on current outcomes.
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to which interest rates respond to increases in output.2 
Under more normal economic conditions, higher interest 
rates would offset roughly two-thirds of the cumulative 
impact of stimulative policies on gross domestic product 
over two years.3
General-Equilibrium Models 
Some skeptics of the efficacy of stimulus policies have 
cited the results of an alternative class of models, which 
tend to imply more modest economic effects from such 
policies. In those models, people are assumed to make 
decisions about how much to work, buy, and save on the 
basis of current and expected future values of the wage 
rate, interest rates, taxes, and government purchases, 
among other things. In the basic form of such models, 
stimulus policies tend to crowd out a significant amount 
of other economic activity, and multipliers tend to be less 
than 1—meaning that stimulative policies have less than 
a dollar-for-dollar impact on output.
Although some analysts favor the rigor of that approach 
to modeling behavior, other analysts view the assump-
tions underlying households’ and businesses’ decision-
making in those models to be unrealistic and to lead to 
unrealistic predictions. In particular, this type of model 
generally assumes that people are fully rational and for-
ward-looking, basing their current decisions on a full life-
time plan. The extreme version of the forward-looking 
assumption implies that people expect eventually to pay 
for any increased government spending or reduced reve-
nues in the form of tax increases and that they incorpo-
rate those expected payments—even if beyond their own 
lifetimes—into their current spending plans. Thus, they 
are assumed to curtail their consumption when govern-
ment spending rises because their lifetime income and 
that of their heirs has fallen by the amount of the even-
tual taxes. For the same reason, in such models, cash 
transfer payments and tax refunds have little or no effect 
on current consumption. People in the models generally 
also have full access to credit markets, so they can borrow 
to maintain consumption in the face of a temporary loss 
of income. This class of model does not typically incor-
porate involuntary unemployment: People can work as 
many hours as they choose at the wage rate determined 
by the market. Finally, in these models, monetary policy 
usually follows the rule that increased output or inflation 
implies higher inflation-adjusted interest rates. 
2. Stimulative policies such as ARRA can lead to higher interest rates 
in two ways. First, if they increase economic activity, they can 
prompt the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to combat 
inflation. However, that effect has been smaller than usual during 
the past year and a half and is likely to remain so in the near term. 
The federal funds rate (the interest rate directly controlled by the 
Federal Reserve) has been near zero since late 2008 and is unlikely 
to be increased significantly until economic conditions have 
improved substantially. Interest rates on short-term government 
securities, which tend to move closely with the federal funds rate, 
also are unlikely to rise for some time. Therefore, CBO estimates 
that expansionary government policies are likely to have less effect 
on interest rates now than under more normal conditions, which 
implies less crowding out. Second, stimulative policies can 
influence longer-term interest rates if they create expectations of 
higher inflation-adjusted interest rates or higher inflation in the 
future. In particular, policies that imply increases in future deficits 
could lead to higher current interest rates to the extent that people 
expect that the deficits will crowd out private investment and 
result in a lower capital stock (which tends to imply both higher 
rates of return on capital and higher interest rates). However, 
the policies in ARRA are temporary and thus are unlikely by 
themselves to have a large impact on the interest rates that people 
expect beyond the next few years. 
3. CBO assumes that as the recovery progresses, the Federal Reserve 
will see less need to provide monetary stimulus. Under CBO’s 
current macroeconomic forecast, that assumption implies that in 
early 2012, the Federal Reserve will gradually begin to offset fiscal 
policy actions by raising interest rates (or engaging in other 
actions to tighten monetary policy) in order to reduce the risk in 
later years of excessive inflation. 
APPENDIX ESTIMATED IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT ON EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC OUTPUT, APRIL 2010–JUNE 2010 11
CBO
Recent research has shown that relaxing some of those 
modeling assumptions can result in much higher multi-
pliers.4 CBO has incorporated the results of that research 
into its view of the effects of government policies. How-
ever, the research results appear to be too dependent on 
particular assumptions for CBO to rely on them heavily.
Extrapolations from Historical Data 
Another type of research uses historical data to directly 
project how government policies will affect the economy 
on the basis of how economic variables such as output 
and consumption have behaved in the past relative to 
government spending and revenues. However, estimates 
of economic effects from this research vary widely and are 
sensitive to the period and estimation strategy used. 
Many estimates of this sort suggest that crowding-out 
effects dominate in the case of government purchases so 
that the impact on output tends to be less than one-for-
one and tends to diminish over time. Some estimates, 
however, suggest multipliers higher than the range esti-
mated by CBO. Estimated multipliers for tax cuts are 
generally higher than those for spending, and they tend 
to grow over time.5
One pitfall of this approach is that the direction of causa-
tion between policies and the economy is not always 
clear. For example, poor economic conditions can 
prompt the government to enact policies such as ARRA 
in an effort to boost economic activity. If weak economic 
performance led to such a policy, it would not be accurate 
to ascribe that performance to the policy, rather than vice 
versa. Likewise, if states and localities reduced purchases 
and laid off employees when their budgets deteriorated in 
a recession, it would not be accurate to blame the reces-
sion on the cuts in government spending. When causa-
tion runs in both directions in this way, the historical cor-
relation between variables is not always the best guide for 
predicting the effects of a new policy proposal.
One strategy that has been applied to overcome that 
obstacle is to try to isolate the economic impact of 
specific policies, such as wartime spending, that are 
arguably unrelated to other economic conditions. 
Wartime spending, however, might not be indicative 
4. For examples of model estimates that incorporate a lower-
than-usual response of interest rates to policy changes, see 
Robert E. Hall, By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Government 
Buys More Output? Working Paper 15496 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2009); 
Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo, 
When Is the Government Spending Multiplier Large? Working Paper 
15394 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, October 2009); and Troy Davig and Eric M. Leeper, 
Monetary–Fiscal Policy Interactions and Fiscal Stimulus, Working 
Paper 15133 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, July 2009). For examples of models that include 
liquidity-constrained or “rule of thumb” agents, see Marco Ratto, 
Werner Roeger, and Jan in ’t Veld, “An Estimated Open-Economy 
DSGE Model of the Euro Area with Fiscal and Monetary Policy,” 
Economic Modelling, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 2009), pp. 222–233; 
Lorenzo Forni, Libero Monteforte, and Luca Sessa, The General 
Equilibrium Effects of Fiscal Policy: Estimates for the Euro Area, 
Banca d’Italia Working Paper 652 (November 2007); and 
Jordi Gali, J. David López-Salido, and Javier Vallés, 
“Understanding the Effects of Government Spending on 
Consumption,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 
vol. 5, no. 1 (March 2007), pp. 227–270. For model estimates in 
which government spending can contribute to future production, 
see Eric M. Leeper, Todd B. Walker, and Shu-Chun Susan Yang, 
Government Investment and Fiscal Stimulus in the Short and Long 
Runs, Working Paper 15153 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau 
of Economic Research, July 2009). For a model that incorporates 
financial frictions in the form of a wedge between the interest rate 
paid by businesses on loans and the rate received by households on 
savings, see Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, “Fiscal Policy in a Model 
with Financial Frictions,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, 
no. 2 (May 2010), pp. 35–40.
5. See Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, “The 
Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a 
New Measure of Fiscal Shocks,” American Economic Review, 
vol. 100, no. 3 (June 2010), pp. 763–801; Robert J. Barro and 
Charles J. Redlick, Macroeconomic Effects from Government 
Purchases and Taxes, Working Paper 15369 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2009); 
Andrew Mountford and Harald Uhlig, What Are the Effects of 
Fiscal Policy Shocks? Working Paper 14551 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2008); 
Roberto Perotti, In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal 
Policy, Working Paper 13143 (Cambridge, Mass.: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, June 2007); Olivier Blanchard and 
Roberto Perotti, “An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic 
Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on 
Output,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117, no. 4 
(November 2002), pp. 1329–1368; and Valerie Ramey and 
Matthew Shapiro, “Costly Capital Reallocation and the Effects of 
Government Spending,” Carnegie–Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy, vol. 48, no. 1 (June 1998), pp. 145–194. In 
interpreting the results of this research, it is important to note that 
the reported multipliers are generally “peak” multipliers—that is, 
they represent the largest effect on output in any one quarter of a 
dollar change to policy that persists in a way that is consistent 
with historical behavior—rather than the cumulative effect of a 
one-time dollar’s worth of policy change, as CBO defines its 
multipliers.
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of the effects of other increases in government spending. 
For example, during World War II, the rationing of many 
goods might have reduced the indirect effects of 
government spending on private consumption and 
investment. More generally, historical evidence shows the 
effects of policies under average economic conditions. 
Under current conditions—in which interest rates are apt 
to be less affected than usual by expansionary government 
policies and in which there are large amounts of idle 
resources—the effects would probably be greater than 
they were, on average, in the past.
